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10h30-11h30 : Markus POSCHKE (Mc Gill University)
The Firm Size Distribution Across Countries and Skill-Biased Change in Entrepreneurial Technology
Abstract:
How and why does the rm size distribution dier across countries? This paper documents that features of the rm size distribution are strongly associated with income per capita. Richer countries have fewer entrepreneurs and fewer small rms. The average, dispersion and skewness of rm size are all larger in richer countries. A simple general equilibrium model of occupational choice with skill-biased change in entrepreneurial technology calibrated to U.S. data can account very well for these patterns. The crucial assumption is that some entrepreneurs benet more from technological progress than others. Marginal entrepreneurs then switch to becoming employees as technology advances.

11h30-12h30 : Thijs van RENS (CREI and Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Structural Unemployment, with Benedikt Herz (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Abstract :
Structural unemployment is due to mismatch between available jobs and workers. We formalize this concept in a simple model of a segmented labor market with search frictions within segments. Worker mobility, job mobility and wage bargaining costs across segments generate structural unemployment. We estimate the contribution of these costs to fluctuations in US unemployment, operationalizing segments as states or industries. Most structural unemployment is due to wage bargaining costs, which are large but nevertheless contribute little to unemployment fluctuations. Structural unemployment is as cyclical as overall unemployment and no more persistent, both in the current and in previous recessions.

12h30-14h00 Lunch

14h00-15h00 : Etienne WASMER (Institute of Political Science of Paris)
A Steady-State Model of a Non-Walrasian Economy with Three Imperfect Markets
Abstract:
Unemployment may depend on equilibrium in other markets than the labor markets. This paper adresses this old idea by introducing search frictions on several markets: in a model of credit and labor market imperfections as in Wasmer and Weil (2004), I further introduce search on the goods market. The model can be solved by blocks: on two of the three markets, the relevant "market tightness" is a constant of parameters. In particular, goods market tightness, expressed as the ratio of unmatched consumers to unmatched firms, is equal to 1 which corresponds to a stochastic Say's law: demand and supply are stochastically in equilibrium. Financial market tightness is also a function of three parameters related to financial frictions. Job creation and employment depend on the equilibrium in the other markets. Reciprocally, higher job destruction implies more volatility of income of individual consumers and higher destruction of consumption matches. This lowers profits and further reduces job creation. Finally, there are complementarities between frictions in each market: in particular, the marginal effect of financial frictions on equilibrium unemployment is amplified by goods market frictions and vice versa.
Text: See Discussion Paper No. 5758

15h00-16h00 : Julien PRAT (Barcelona Graduate School of Economics)
Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning, with Carlos Alos-Ferrer (University of Konstanz)
Abstract:
We consider a signaling model where the receiver is able to update his belief about the sender’s type after the signaling stage. We introduce Bayesian learning in a variety of environments ranging from simple two-period to continuous time models with stochastic production. Signaling equilibria present two major departures from those obtained in models without learning. First, new mixedstrategy equilibria involving multiple pooling are possible. Second, pooling equilibria can survive the Intuitive Criterion when learning is fast enough.

16h00-16h15 Coffee break

16h15-17h15 : Giulio FELLA (Queen Mary University of London)
Matching, Wage Rigidities and Efficient Severance Pay
Abstract:
Mandated severance payments are due only if a separation is labelled a layoff rather than a quit. Also, firms and workers have significant incentives to renegotiate mandated severance pay by means of spot side payments upon separation whenever it is Pareto optimal to do so. This paper incorporates these two features in a matching model of equilibrium unemployment which allows for a variety of wage setting mechanisms. With unrestriced bonding, severance pay matters only if real wage rigidities imply inefficient separation under employment-at-will. In such a case, large enough severance payments reduce job destruction and increase job creation and efficiency, under very mild restrictions. Their marginal effect is zero when their size exceeds that which induces the same allocation that would prevail in the absence of wage rigidity.
 

17h15-18h15 : Gianluca VIOLANTE (New York University, CEPR and NBER)
Measuring Mismatch in the US Labor Market, with Aysegul Sahin (Federal Reserve Bank of New York ), Joseph Song (Federal Reserve Bank of New York) and Giorgio Topa (Federal Reserve Bank of New York and IZA)
Abstract:
This paper measures mismatch between job-seekers and vacancies in the U.S. labor market. Mismatch is defined as the distance between the observed allocation of unemployment across sectors and the optimal allocation chosen by a planner who can freely move labor between sectors. The planner’s optimal allocation is dictated by a “generalized Jackman-Roper condition” where (productive and matching) efficiency-weighted vacancy-unemployment ratios are equated across sectors. We develop this condition into mismatch indexes that allow us to quantify how much of the recent rise in U.S. unemployment is due to an increase in mismatch. We use two sources of cross-sectional data on vacancies, JOLTS and HWOL, together with unemployment data from the CPS. Higher mismatch across industries and occupations accounts for 0.8 to 1.4 percentage points of the recent rise in the unemployment rate, whereas geographical mismatch plays no role. We find that the role of mismatch in explaining the increase in unemployment varies considerably by education. Occupationalmismatch explains a substantial fraction of the rise in unemployment (one third) for highly educated workers while it is quantitatively less important for less educated workers.

Les frais d’inscription pour les participants ne présentant pas un article sont de 35 € (le déjeuner et les pauses cafés sont inclus)

> modalités de paiement

L'Ensai est située sur le campus de Ker Lann à Bruz, au sud de Rennes en direction de Redon.

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Le campus est à vingt minutes en bus (lignes 57, 57/59 ou Ker Lann Express) de Rennes. Le départ du bus se fait à l'arrêt République-Rennes. Retrouvez tous les horaires sur www.star.fr.

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> Les hôtels :

Les hôtels suivants sont situés à proximité de la gare et du centre ville de Rennes :

Hôtel de Nemours
5 rue de Nemours, 35000 RENNES - France
Tél : +33 (0)2 99 78 26 26, Fax : +33 (0)2 99 78 25 40
E-mail : resa@hotelnemours.com

Hôtel IBIS
15 rue de Châtillon. Esplanade Fulgence Bienvenue - 35000 - RENNES - France
Tel : (+33)2/23360136 Fax : (+33)2/23360137
E-mail: h3450@accor.com

Hôtel Le Bretagne
7 bis place de la Gare • 35000 Rennes • Tél. : 02 99 31 48 48 • Fax : 02 99 30 45 47
E-mail : le.bretagne.hotel@wanadoo.fr
http://www.hotel-le-bretagne.fr/

Angélina Hôtel
1, Quai Lamennais - 35000 RENNES
Tél. 02 99 79 29 66 - Fax 02 99 79 61 01
E-mail : angelina-hotel@voila.fr
http://www.angelina-hotel.com/

Hôtel le Victoria
35 avenue de Janvier - 35000 Rennes
Téléphone: +33 2 99 31 69 11 - Fax: +33 2 99 31 40 11
E-mail: contacts@hotel-levictoria.com